When the Confederates captured Harper's Ferry, during the Antietam Campaign, they also captured eleven thousand Federal soldiers; who all had to be paroled in the couple of days before A.P. Hill's Division was ordered to Sharpsburg.

Does anybody have an idea how this parole was handeled? I find it difficult to believe the Rebs left eleven thousand Federals wandering around in their rear, even if they were disarmed.    

--Last edited by Bill on 2007-09-24 13:05:34 --

Bill

Weren't most of those troops sent out west to fight the Indians in Minnesota and those types of areas?  Since to put them back into the war would be in violation of the parole.

Some of the men (125th New York State Vols and others) were sent to Camp Douglass in order to serve out their paroles. The 12th NY National Guard was sent back to NYC with orders to "disband". I cannot speak for the others.

Regards,
Alexander Stowe

Guys,

I was was really wondering how the paroles were administrated. That was a bunch of people to deal with in a very short period of time. I am also interested in how these troops were transported north. It takes a lot of logistics to deal with eleven thousand people.

This is not something that folks often discuss in detail, for perhaps obvious reasons.  Different units ended up in different locations; according to a history I have of the Garibaldi Guard, D'Utassy initially refused to acknowledge the surrender, but later the whole of the 39th ended up at, I think, Camp Chase.  The 1st Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade (who we portrayed at Spangler's Spring a couple of years back) ended up at Camp Parole in Anapolis.

The formal exchange cartel had been signed in July and can be found at:  http://users.aol.com/jfepperson/cartel.html

It certainly would have been onerous to sign individual paroles in duplicate, but apparently the administrative staff were up to the challenge, though it took a couple days.  Duplicate muster rolls were made out and signed and the men were sworn verbally to abide by the terms of the parole while officers received individual forms. Here's one account of the process from the OR, which also contains an account of D'Utassy's attempt to slip out of it:

http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/moa/pageviewer?frames=1&cite=http%3A%2F%2Fcdl.library.cornell.edu%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmoa%2Fmoa-cgi%3Fnotisid%3DANU4519-0027&coll=moa&root=%2Fmoa%2Fwaro%2Fwaro0027%2F&tif=00568.TIF&view=text

HEADQUARTERS POST,
Annapolis, Md., September 23, 1862.
Upon the afternoon of Monday, the 15th ultimo [instant], I was directed to call upon Brig. Gen. L. O’B. Branch, of the rebel army, and ascertain from him what disposition was to be made of the surrendered forces at Harper’s Ferry, contained in the First Brigade, Colonel iD’Utassy. I immediately proceeded to his headquarters, and learned that duplicate muster-rolls would be required; that our regiments and batteries were to be drawn up as for muster, the roll to be called, men to answer, &c.; the form of parole then to be read to them, and the men, raising their right hands, to promise not to serVe against the so-called Southern Confederacy until regalarly exchanged; officers to sign individual paroles.
I returned to my colonel and reported. Rolls of the regiments and batteries were prepared, and in the case of my own (the Thirty-ninth Regiment) the names of no officers save those of company commanders were included.
At about 6 p. m. word was sent to General Branch that the muster-rolls of the brigade were ready, and we would feel obliged if he (General Branch) would come over and parole us, as he had said he would.
He came. The Thirty-ninth New York was formed in column of companies, non-commissioned staff in front, Colonel D’Utassy, Colonel Segoine, of the One hundred and eleventh, and Mr. Kent, correspondent of the New York Tribune, who was at the time acting in the capacity of private secretary to Colonel D’Utassy. I also accompanied them.  When we reached the head of the column, General Branch was handed the muster-roll of the first company. Turning to Colonel D’Utassy, he remarked, “I suppose, colonel, you understand this parole as I do, viz,that you and your men understand you are not to go into a camp of instruction or drill until such time as you may be exchanged.” Colonel D’Utassy immediately exclaimed, in an excited manner, “No, sir, I understand nothing of the kind. Such an understanding would not be correct. Suppose my Government desired to use this paroled force against the Indians of the Northwest, who are, like you, in a state of insurrection, would you, sir, consider that as a violation ot our parole.”
“Well, no,” said Branch, “I do not think I would” “Then, sir,” said D’Utassy, breaking in, “in the present state of our forces here surrendered, some of whom are green troops, it might be necussary to place them in a camp of instruction. I must, therefore, sir, decline accepting a parole for my men on the condition now imposed by you, which I am positive was not intended at the time the articles of capitulation were drawn up.” Colonel Segoine and Mr. Kent also gave it as their opinion that such a construction could not be placed upon the simple words contained in the articles of capitulation, such as “will not serve until regularly exchanged.” Upon this decision of Colonel D’Utassy, General Branch refused to parole any of the troops until he could ascertain the understanding of the disputed point as entertained by General A. P. Hill. He (General Branch) then wrote a note to General Hill, sent it, and, after awaiting an answer until after dark, said he would go to his quarters, and we might send about 9 o’clock for his answer.  At that hour, in company with Mr. Kent, I called upon General Branch, and he then stated that General Hill concurred with him in his view of the parole. I reported this fact to Colonel D’Utassy, who said that he would rather go to Richmond than take such a parole. He then gave orders for our brigade to be ready to move at dawn next morning (the 16th). This was done, and by 6 next morning we were in motion for the pontoon bridge. I handed the muster-rolls to General Hill at his headquarters, and asked a pass for the brigade. He asked if the brigade was paroled. I replied, evasively, I thought so. He then sat
down and wrote a pass, upon which we immediately crossed the river, thus giving them the slip.
Upon the announcement of the surrender, Colonel D’Utassy ordered the colors of all the regiments of our brigade to be conveyed to his headquarters. This was done, and two hours were spent in removing the various colors from their staffs and packing them in the colonel’s private trunk.
The adjutant-general of General Gregg made several demands on me for the colors where I was engaged on the hill turning over the arms.  I informed him that they had been sent to our brigade headquarters.  He left, but shortly returned and stated that he could uot find them.  I said I regretted it, but could not aid him; that he must see my colonel.  These flags are now in my colonel’s private trunks in this city. These are the simple facts, which, on my honor as a gentleman, I certify to.
CHAS. GRAHAM BACON,
Lieutenant, and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.


Time obviously had something to do with the mass-parole.  I have seen pre-printed forms used for the surrenders at Vicksburg and Appomattox.  John Henry Otto speaks of a sergeant in his regiment at Perryville who went out of his way to "surrender" to a Confederate burial party after the battle, then showed his hand-written "parole" as a way of going home.  I forget how that worked out.

As for transport, the US Army had railheads in Frederick and, I think, Martinsburg.  Unlike the CS forces, who had to bring any supplies forward by wagon from Strasburg, the north had rail links to within ten miles of Sharpsburg.  The amount of munitions and other supplies headed toward McClellan's army was enormous.  I assume that, after the wounded were brought out, there would be plenty of room for paroled POWs.

Mike,

Brunswick (Berlin during ACW), Md which is down river from Harpers Ferry is less then 10 mile away  and would be the closest rail line what would not have been damaged or in Southern control.  The federal troop could have easily marched to Berlin down the C&O canal to get to the railway station.  I’m not say that this is what they did but it would have been an option.

Mike,

If the Federal Adjutants hadn't been so efficient getting those muster rolls completed and A.P. Hill had been stuck with dealing with eleven thousand prisoners, I wonder how many troops he would have been forced to leave behind, when he took off for Sharpsburg? An interesting "What If."